In the complicated and multi-faceted Rubik’s cube conflict scenario surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the potential outcomes of strategic interaction resemble a multi-player game in which each actor—Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., the U.K., the E.U., and other European states—has its own preferences, incentives, and risk tolerances. Game theory, and in particular the concept of Nash equilibrium, provides a useful lens through which to evaluate these outcomes. Several possible equilibria are emerging or being tested in the current conflict, but not all are stable, and fewer still are desirable. Among them, a modified version of the post-WWII West-East Germany model, in which Ukraine becomes a Western-oriented but partially divided state with a Russian buffer zone enclave, is perhaps the most realistic and sustainable Nash equilibrium available. While it may not be morally satisfying or politically idealistic, it reflects the long-term logic of deterrence, containment, and pragmatic peace.

The Breakdown of Initial Equilibria

The first attempt at strategic balance occurred during the post-Maidan years (2014–2021), where the West employed limited sanctions while Ukraine was left to manage the war in Donbas largely alone. Russia operated under the assumption that Ukraine would never be absorbed into NATO, and the West avoided direct confrontation. This was an unstable equilibrium—what might be called a low-cost deterrence equilibrium—because both sides misread the other’s willingness to escalate. The full-scale invasion in 2022 shattered that fragile balance, introducing a new and more dangerous set of strategies. Russia sought a rapid military victory to impose a client regime in Kyiv; the West responded with sanctions, arms shipments, and support that stopped short of direct military intervention. Each side expected to shift the status quo in its favour, but the battlefield stalemate and economic resilience on both sides have produced a war of attrition equilibrium. This equilibrium is inherently unstable and costly: Ukraine suffers territorial devastation; Russia endures long-term economic isolation; and the West faces inflation, security threats, and the political risks of fatigue and polarisation.

The “Coalition of the Willing” strategy, where select Western states act unilaterally or in small groups outside established institutions like NATO or the UN to directly intervene in conflicts, may seem like a bold moral stand. However, in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, this approach represents a deeply flawed and strategically risky path. It undermines collective deterrence, provokes escalation, and ultimately weakens Western cohesion. A more sustainable equilibrium would mirror the post-WWII treatment of Germany: a neutral, demilitarised Ukraine integrated economically with the West, while Russia retains limited territorial gains under cold peace conditions, with sanctions maintaining pressure over time.

The Problem with the “Coalition of the Willing”

At the heart of this configuration lies a contradiction between ambition and reality. The United Kingdom, in particular, plays a central role in projecting this alternative structure. Following its departure from the European Union, the UKrays has sought to reinvent its global identity through slogans like “Global Britain.” Its willingness to take the lead in supporting Ukraine—both rhetorically and materially—serves as a demonstration of its self-image as a military and diplomatic heavyweight. Yet this maneuver is not without cost. In seeking to position itself as a unilateral leader in European security, the UK implicitly challenges the role of NATO, an institution built on collective deterrence, cohesion, and clear strategic consensus. The Coalition of the Willing, then, is less than a symptom of post-Brexit identity crisis, of NATO’s ongoing adaptation, of Europe’s uncertainty about its role in the world. It is a performance of power, but one that risks rupturing the very alliances on which peace and stability depend. In the pursuit of deterrence, the West must not forget that its greatest asset is not any single coalition, but the trust it inspires when it speaks and acts as one within NATO Treaties, as a geopolitical coordinated entity made of 32 NATO Member Countries.

The “Coalition of the Willing” could be defined as a “Dickheads’ Idea” without any strategy nor purpose. Although the noble ideal of continuing to support Ukraine to contain Russian aggression, the “Coalition of The Willing” contains strategic flaws, as this geo-political coalition works in parallel with NATO, but without any formal agreement nor treaty, so there are no binding terms in international law, that’s how again the United Kingdom acting unilaterally from Brexit to Ukraine, risks of undermining NATO and Europe, as sovereign countries in Europe could be very reluctant to support the “Coalition of The Willing” in terms of deploying troops in Ukraine with heightening the risk of direct confrontation and escalation against Russia, meanwhile the United States would disengage and utilize a restraint strategy in order to avoid direct escalation against Russia. The strategic and disequilibrium flaws of the “Coalition of the Willing” are all there to see and understand, the UK, France, Poland and Germany risk acting unilaterally without the wider NATO Treaty support, while crucially the United States pursues a completely different strategy equilibrium that is of Ceasefire, Demilitarisation and Peace Treaty, as the United States has clearly stated that the ongoing conflict can’t be resolved militarly while at the same time the United States delegation has also signalled a more hawkish stance of disengagement, that would weaken the whole NATO and European Defence leverage on Russia. However, the starting point it’s that both the United States and Russia meet at the same equilibrium point that provides equal payoff to both countries, that it’s stable equilibrium, without escalation, where the post-war scenario of West-East Germany informs the potential Nash Equilibrium in geopolitical strategic terms where Russia hold on part of the occupied territory, while Ukraine slowly decreases its military posture and at the same time access integration in the European Union economic area, without any formal access to NATO membership, but at the same time maintaining United States support in the form of economic cooperation. On the other side, Russia can claim its “victory” for having held onto the occupied territory, from where more natural and economic resources can be extracted, while also obtaining approval from the internal Russian population, that can solidify the ruling position of the Russian Oligarchy over the country and the collective Russian population perception of the Russian leadership. In the so called “Cold Peace Scenario” Nash Equilibrium payoff both Russia and United States are able to maximize their payoff strategy while also Ukraine, the wider European Union member states and the UK would be able to achieve maximum payoff equilibria, with Ukraine accessing the European Union economic area, without formal NATO partnership, while ceding part of its territory to avoid escalation.

The Optimal Equilibrium: A West-East Ukraine Scenario

Amid these conflicting strategies, a more stable and achievable equilibrium emerges: a de facto divided Ukraine, echoing the Cold War structure of Germany, in which the western portion becomes a fully integrated part of the Western economic and political system, while the eastern regions under Russian control remain frozen in contested status. This “West-East Ukraine” model would mirror the German situation from 1949 to 1989: two systems, two sovereignties, one people divided by a geopolitical frontier.

From a Nash equilibrium standpoint, this scenario aligns incentives in a more sustainable way:

Russia retains some territorial gains (Crimea, Donbas), avoiding domestic humiliation or regime collapse, and reducing its incentive to escalate further, obtains oversight on the “buffer zone”, and obtains more economic and natural resources. While decreasing the military stance in order to relieve the Russian economy and civilian economic activities and businesses.

United States obtains descalation and demilitarisation, avoiding direct confrontation with Russia, while also obtaining a long-term economic payoff of Ukraine’s natural resources and savings from military expenditures.

NATO and EU maintain their coherence and credibility by uniting around clear, bounded objectives rather than open-ended conflict.

Ukraine gains full military and economic backing from the West, potentially leading to EU integration for the unoccupied part of its territory. This offers a clear reward path without requiring full territorial victory. The West avoids direct military confrontation with Russia while achieving its strategic goal of preventing Russian dominance over all of Ukraine.

Global economic stability benefits from the reduction of uncertainty, even if sanctions on Russia remain.

This scenario is not ideal in moral terms—it implicitly accepts the loss of territory due to aggression—but in realist and strategic terms, it may be the only available Pareto-optimal outcome: no party can be made better off without making another worse off. Moreover, the analogy to Cold War Germany shows how such an arrangement can be leveraged over time. West Germany’s eventual prosperity and success helped undermine East German legitimacy. A Western-backed Ukraine that flourishes economically and politically could, over decades, become a soft power magnet that pulls the occupied territories back toward Kyiv, not through war, but through generational change. The West-East Germany model offers a strategic framework anchored in historical precedent, economic logic, and a pathway to eventual reunification. It does not demand that the West betray Ukraine, but rather that it protect Ukraine’s future through durable institutions and long-term economic integration, not by sacrificing unity in a rush to confront.

All conflicts and wars end not with the satisfaction of maximalist aims but with the recognition of equilibrium, when each side sees that further escalation will only produce worse outcomes. The Cold War showed that containment, not confrontation, often yields the most lasting form of victory. The challenge today is whether Western leaders can resist the temptations of drama and optics, and instead embrace the quiet logic of a cold peace.

All the issues and disequilibria in the Coalition of the Willing format

Although a noble framework of intent, the Coalition of the Willing format it’s similar to a playground “Dickheads’ bad idea” of throwing a moltov cocktail to an already highly inflamable situation.

The idea behind the Coalition of the Willing is to take immediate, decisive action when multilateral consensus fails. In practice, this results in fragmenting the West in sparse order, weakening NATO’s legitimacy, and handing Russia the propaganda victory of a “divided Europe.” All the issues and disequilibria:

Strategic Fragmentation: By bypassing NATO and the EU, states like the UK, Poland, or France may embolden others to pursue unilateral action. This diminishes strategic unity, especially when the United States chooses restraint. A fractured deterrence invites miscalculation.

Escalation Risk: Sending troops or declaring red lines outside NATO Article 5 introduces ambiguity. Russia has signalled repeatedly that it considers foreign military presence in Ukraine a red line. This risks turning a regional conflict into a broader war—a scenario all parties wish to avoid.

Erosion of Legal Norms: Operating outside international law or supranational consensus damages the very rules-based order the West claims to defend.

All this undermines not only NATO, but also the larger Western World project of supporting Ukraine as a democratic, sovereign nation. A divided West, even if united in arms, cannot offer Ukraine a stable pathway to recovery or integration. The contradictions at the heart of the Coalition of the Willing—between unity and unilateralism, realism and ambition, institutional loyalty and national prestige—make it a brittle foundation for long-term strategy.

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Latest Russia–Ukraine Negotiation Updates

Reuters

• Ukraine Calls for Increased Pressure After Drone Attack Post-Talks
  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy urged for heightened international sanctions against Russia following a deadly drone attack that occurred just hours after peace talks in Istanbul failed to achieve a ceasefire. Reuters+1Reuters+1
• Russia Launches Largest Drone Attack Following Peace Talks
  Russia deployed 273 drones in its most extensive drone assault since the war’s inception, targeting multiple Ukrainian regions shortly after inconclusive peace negotiations in Istanbul. Reuters
• Trump to Engage in Talks with Putin and Zelenskiy
  U.S. President Donald Trump announced plans to speak with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to discuss efforts to end the ongoing conflict. Reuters+1Reuters+1

TASS

• Russia and Ukraine Agree on Prisoner Exchange and Future Dialogue
  During negotiations in Istanbul, both sides agreed to exchange 1,000 prisoners of war and to present detailed proposals for a ceasefire in upcoming discussions. Reuters+7TASS+7TASS+7
• Russia to Prepare Document Outlining Ceasefire Demands
  Russia announced plans to draft a document detailing its ceasefire demands to be presented to Ukraine in future negotiations. TASS

United Nations

• UN Welcomes Resumption of Russia-Ukraine Talks
  The United Nations expressed approval of the recent negotiations between Russia and Ukraine held in Türkiye, viewing them as a positive step towards peace. Dipartimento Affari Politici e Pace
• UN Secretary-General Skeptical About Immediate Serious Peace Negotiations
  The UN Secretary-General stated that he does not believe there is currently an opportunity to organize serious peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. press.un.org+6operationalsupport.un.org+6Reuters+6