Stabilization Through Peacekeeping: The Strategic Role of a Joint Task Force in the Persian Gulf
The Islamic Republic of Iran stands at a critical juncture in 2025. Iranian authorities have continued to repress peaceful dissent and political protest, with February 2025 alone witnessing 216 demonstrations amid economic and political crisis. In June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations for the first time in 20 years. Against this backdrop of internal unrest and instability, the necessity of a coordinated Joint Task Force in the Persian Gulf could become the successful strategy to stabilise Iran, where a four-nation JTF comprising the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and Greece could provide a stabilisation framework should the current regime collapse, while at the same time avoiding an environment disaster and the risk of irreparably damaging Iran underground nuclear facilities with far lasting consequences. The only viable strategic approach can be only a Joint Task Force in the Persian Gulf.
Ayatollah Regime Crisis and Iranian People’s Uprising
Despite repression, protests continue at an accelerated pace, with the continued detention and mistreatment of political prisoners reflecting the Islamic Republic’s intolerance of dissent. The Iranian people have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of systematic oppression. Demonstrators demand an end to gender-based discrimination and systemic oppression, facing severe crackdowns by authorities, with this movement transcending borders and inspiring solidarity protests across Europe and beyond. The regime’s response has been characteristically brutal. So far, 10 men have been executed in the context of the protests, and at least 11 men and 3 women remain at risk of execution. Despite such reprisals, labour protests have increased in recent years due to growing economic hardship, with nurses arrested after nationwide protests over working conditions and wages. The nuclear dimension adds urgency to the Iranian crisis. October 2025 will be the last opportunity for world powers to initiate the snapback mechanism, with Iran threatening that activating this mechanism will inevitably lead Tehran to further escalation. Israeli officials have acknowledged that Iran’s nuclear program “cannot be destroyed through kinetic means” and that “only the Americans can make that happen”, although all considered, the risks of nuclear proliferation if nuclear energy facilities are going to be degraded are too high risk of instability and could become unproductive, therefore, the only possible This nuclear timeline creates a narrow window for diplomatic solutions and underscores the potential need for international intervention should the regime collapse amid nuclear instability.
Joint Task Force Operation led by the United States and the United Kingdom, involving Italy and Greece assets
The United States would deploy multiple Carrier Strike Groups built around either Ford-class or Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, each capable of launching 75-80 aircraft, including F/A-18 Super Hornets, EA-18G Growlers for electronic warfare, and E-2D Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft. These carrier groups would be escorted by Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers, providing layered air defence and land-attack capabilities through Tomahawk cruise missiles. Amphibious Ready Groups would transport Marine Expeditionary Units, combining Wasp-class or America-class amphibious assault ships with San Antonio-class landing platform docks and Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ships. The submarine force would include Virginia-class and Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines capable of intelligence gathering, special operations support, and precision strikes using Tomahawk missiles. Extensive logistics support would come from Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ships, Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oilers, and Expeditionary Fast Transport vessels.
Air Power: American air superiority would be established through fifth-generation F-22 Raptor stealth fighters, unmatched in air-to-air combat, working alongside F-35A Lightning II multirole stealth aircraft capable of both air-to-air and precision ground attack missions. Strategic bombing capabilities would be provided by B-52 Stratofortress aircraft for long-range missions and B-1 Lancer supersonic bombers for rapid strike operations. The massive logistics requirements of sustained air operations would be met by KC-135 Stratotanker and next-generation KC-46 Pegasus aerial refuelling aircraft, enabling extended range operations from regional bases. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance would be provided by high-altitude Global Hawk drones for strategic intelligence, MQ-9 Reaper drones for tactical intelligence and precision strikes, and manned platforms like the U-2 Dragon Lady for specialised missions.
Ground Forces: Rapid deployment capabilities would centre on Marine Expeditionary Forces, self-contained air-ground task forces capable of forced entry operations and sustained combat in multiple threat environments. The Army would contribute airborne divisions trained for rapid deployment behind enemy lines and air assault divisions specialising in helicopter-borne operations in complex terrain. Special Operations Command would provide the full spectrum of special operations capabilities, including Navy SEALs for maritime operations, Army Rangers for direct action missions, Green Berets for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defence, and Delta Force for counterterrorism operations.
United Kingdom: Experienced Partnership and Specialised Capabilities
Britain brings unique value through its post-conflict experience and specialised military capabilities:
Naval Contribution: The Royal Navy would deploy HMS Queen Elizabeth, Britain’s flagship aircraft carrier, capable of operating up to 36 F-35B Lightning II short takeoff and vertical landing stealth fighters, though typical deployments would include 12-24 aircraft to allow for helicopter operations and maintenance cycles. The carrier would be escorted by Type 45 destroyers, among the most advanced air defence vessels in the world, equipped with the Sea Viper missile system capable of engaging multiple aerial threats simultaneously at ranges exceeding 120 kilometres. Astute-class nuclear attack submarines would provide underwater warfare capabilities, intelligence gathering, and precision strike options through Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, while their advanced sonar systems and stealth characteristics make them ideal for operations in contested waters. Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, including Wave-class fleet tankers, Bay-class landing ship docks, and Fort Victoria-class fleet replenishment ship, would provide the logistics backbone necessary for sustained operations far from home ports.
Air Assets: The Royal Air Force would contribute Typhoon FGR4 multirole fighters, advanced swing-role aircraft capable of air-to-air combat and precision ground attack missions, equipped with Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and Storm Shadow cruise missiles for deep strike operations. Strategic airlift capabilities would be provided by C-17 Globemaster III aircraft, capable of carrying outsized cargo and personnel directly into austere airfields, while A400M Atlas tactical transports would handle theatre airlift requirements. Special forces aviation support would include helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft optimised for insertion, extraction, and support of special operations forces in hostile environments.
Strategic Value: Britain brings extensive experience gained from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Libya, providing invaluable lessons learned in post-conflict stabilisation, civilian-military cooperation, and transitional governance support. The United Kingdom maintains strong diplomatic relationships throughout the Persian Gulf region, including defence partnerships with the UAE, Oman, and other Gulf Cooperation Council states that could prove crucial for basing rights and political support. British intelligence services offer world-class capabilities in human intelligence, signals intelligence, and strategic assessment, while the Government Communications Headquarters provides advanced cyber warfare and electronic intelligence capabilities that would be essential for understanding and disrupting Iranian command and control systems.
Italy: Mediterranean Leadership and Expeditionary Capabilities
Italy’s contribution would be substantial, reflecting its position as a major European naval power: Naval Assets: Italy’s naval contribution would be anchored by the aircraft carrier Cavour (CVH 550), a 27,000-ton vessel that serves as the flagship of Italian naval power and represents one of Europe’s most capable light aircraft carriers. The ship can operationally deploy 5-10 F-35B STOVL stealth fighters, which provide both air superiority and precision strike capabilities with advanced sensors and stealth characteristics that would be crucial in contested airspace. The carrier also embarks NH-90 multirole helicopters for anti-submarine warfare, utility transport, and search and rescue operations, as well as EH-101 helicopters optimised for anti-submarine warfare with advanced sonar systems and anti-submarine torpedoes. The ship’s command and control facilities make it ideal for serving as a joint task force flagship, coordinating multinational naval operations across the Persian Gulf.
The amphibious assault ship Trieste (L9890) represents the newest addition to Italian naval capabilities, a 33,000-ton landing helicopter dock similar in concept to the French Mistral-class or Spanish Juan Carlos I. This vessel can deploy the elite San Marco Brigade marines, Italy’s premier amphibious warfare unit, along with their equipment, including Centauro B1 wheeled tank destroyers, Freccia infantry fighting vehicles, and VTLM Lince protected vehicles. The ship’s flight deck can simultaneously operate multiple helicopters while its well deck can launch landing craft mechanised (LCM) for ship-to-shore operations. The Trieste’s medical facilities and humanitarian supplies make it particularly valuable for post-conflict stabilisation operations.
Italy’s ten FREMM frigates of the Bergamini class represent among the most advanced surface combatants in European service, each displacing 6,700 tons and equipped with sophisticated multi-role capabilities. These vessels excel in anti-submarine warfare through their hull-mounted and towed array sonars, anti-air warfare through their Aster-15 and Aster-30 surface-to-air missiles, and anti-surface warfare through their Otomat Mk2 anti-ship missiles. Their 127mm main guns provide naval gunfire support for amphibious operations, while their flight decks can operate NH-90 or SH-101 helicopters for extended reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare.
The two Horizon-class air-defence destroyers, Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio, provide fleet-level air defence through their sophisticated EMPAR rotating phased-array radars and Aster-30 long-range surface-to-air missiles capable of engaging ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft at ranges up to 120 kilometres. These vessels would serve as escort units for high-value platforms like Cavour or provide area air defence for amphibious operations and logistics convoys.
Air Power Projection: Italian air power would be spearheaded by more than 30 operational F-35A Lightning II conventional takeoff and landing variants, representing the most advanced multirole stealth fighters available to European forces. These aircraft combine stealth characteristics with advanced sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, and precision strike weapons, making them ideal for operations in contested airspace where Iranian air defences might still be active. The F-35A’s advanced targeting systems and data-linking capabilities allow for coordinated strikes and real-time intelligence sharing with coalition partners. The Italian Air Force operates more than 70 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft in air superiority and multirole configurations, providing substantial air-to-air combat capabilities and precision ground attack options. These aircraft are equipped with Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, IRIS-T short-range air-to-air missiles, and various precision-guided munitions for ground attack missions. Their advanced radar systems and electronic warfare capabilities make them valuable for both air superiority and suppression of enemy air defence missions. Aerial refuelling and strategic mobility would be provided by KC-767A tanker aircraft based on the Boeing 767 commercial airliner, capable of refuelling both boom and probe-equipped aircraft and extending the range of Italian fighters operating from regional bases in the UAE, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia. C-130J Super Hercules and C-27J Spartan tactical airlifters would provide theatre airlift for personnel, supplies, and equipment, with the ability to operate from austere airfields that might be critical during initial stabilisation operations. Italy operates MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision strike missions, providing persistent surveillance capabilities and the ability to conduct targeted strikes against specific threats while minimising risk to manned aircraft and coalition personnel. These systems would be particularly valuable for monitoring border areas, tracking potential threats, and providing overwatch for ground operations.
Ground Forces: The San Marco Brigade represents approximately 3,000 elite marines trained specifically for amphibious operations and expeditionary warfare in littoral environments similar to the Persian Gulf region. These forces are equipped with Centauro B1 wheeled tank destroyers for mobile firepower, Freccia 8×8 infantry fighting vehicles for protected mobility, and VTLM Lince protected patrol vehicles for reconnaissance and security operations. The brigade’s specialised training in amphibious warfare, urban operations, and expeditionary logistics would make them particularly valuable for securing key infrastructure, protecting humanitarian operations, and providing security for international organisations during the stabilisation phase.
Greece: Regional Expertise and Modern Capabilities
Greece’s strategic position and recently modernised forces offer significant coalition value:
Naval Contribution: Greece’s frigate force consists of nine modern surface combatants divided between MEKO 200HN frigates and Elli-class frigates (based on the Dutch Kortenaer design), each displacing approximately 4,000 tons and equipped for multi-role operations. The MEKO 200HN frigates are armed with Exocet MM40 Block II anti-ship missiles, Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles, and 127mm main guns, while also carrying advanced sonar systems for anti-submarine warfare. The Elli-class frigates provide similar capabilities with slightly different sensor and weapon configurations, but both classes are capable of anti-air warfare against aircraft and missiles, anti-surface warfare against enemy vessels, and limited anti-submarine warfare operations that would be valuable in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf.
The amphibious capability is provided by four to five Jason-class landing ship tanks, Greek-built vessels based on German designs that can carry main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, trucks, and personnel. These ships feature helicopter landing decks that can accommodate medium-lift helicopters, and their shallow draft allows them to conduct beach landings in areas where larger amphibious vessels cannot operate. They would typically carry Greek marine contingents totalling 500-1,000 specially trained troops equipped for amphibious and coastal operations. Support vessels include a limited number of fleet tankers and auxiliary vessels that provide logistics support for extended operations, though Greece would likely depend heavily on allied logistics support for sustained operations far from home waters.
Air Assets: The Hellenic Air Force’s most capable aircraft are 18-24 Rafale F3R multirole fighters, representing the latest standard of this advanced European fighter aircraft. The Rafale combines excellent air-to-air capabilities with sophisticated ground attack systems, equipped with Meteor beyond-visual-range missiles, MICA infrared and radar-guided missiles, and SCALP cruise missiles for deep strike operations. The aircraft’s advanced RBE2 AESA radar and SPECTRA electronic warfare system make it highly effective in contested airspace, while its omnirole design allows it to switch between air-to-air and air-to-ground missions during the same sortie. Greece is modernising approximately 80 F-16 Fighting Falcons to the Viper Block 72 configuration, which represents the most advanced version of this proven multirole fighter. These upgraded aircraft feature advanced AESA radars, modern electronic warfare systems, and compatibility with the latest American precision-guided munitions. The F-16V’s proven reliability and extensive weapons compatibility make it ideal for sustained operations, while its relatively low operating costs allow for high sortie rates during extended operations. The remaining Mirage 2000-5 interceptors provide additional air defence capabilities, though in limited numbers, equipped with MICA missiles and serving primarily in the air-to-air role with some precision ground attack capability. Airlift capabilities are provided by four to six operational C-130H Hercules aircraft, the reliable workhorses of tactical airlift that can operate from short, unpaved airstrips and carry oversized cargo or paratroopers. These aircraft would be essential for logistics support, medical evacuation, and personnel transport during stabilisation operations. The helicopter fleet includes NH-90 multirole helicopters for transport and utility missions, CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters capable of carrying artillery pieces, vehicles, or large numbers of personnel, and Apache AH-64 attack helicopters for close air support, reconnaissance, and security operations. This rotary-wing capability would be particularly valuable for operations in urban areas or difficult terrain where fixed-wing aircraft cannot provide the same level of support.
Strategic Advantages: Greece possesses extensive knowledge of Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern political, cultural, and military dynamics gained through centuries of regional involvement and modern military cooperation agreements. Greek military officers and diplomats have experience working with Middle Eastern counterparts and understand the complex sectarian, ethnic, and tribal dynamics that would be crucial during a stabilisation operation in Iran. As a NATO member since 1952, Greece has achieved high levels of interoperability with American and other NATO forces through standardised procedures, communication systems, and training programs. Greek forces regularly participate in NATO exercises and have experience in joint operations, making integration with American, British, and Italian forces more straightforward than would be the case with non-NATO partners.
Greece maintains cultural and historical connections to various populations in the broader region, including Christian minorities, and has experience in complex multi-ethnic environments that could be valuable when dealing with Iran’s diverse population of Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and other ethnic groups. This cultural awareness could prove crucial in avoiding the mistakes that have plagued previous intervention operations in the Middle East.
Operational Deployment and Objectives
Phase I: Stabilisation and Security (Months 1-6)
Primary Objectives:
- Secure critical infrastructure, including ports, airports, and communication centres
- Establish safe corridors for humanitarian assistance
- Monitor and secure nuclear facilities in coordination with IAEA
- Provide security for international organisations and NGOs
Naval Deployment: The coalition naval task force would establish a robust presence in the Persian Gulf, with Italian Cavour serving as a forward command platform alongside US carrier strike groups. Greek and Italian submarines would provide underwater surveillance and deterrence against regional threats. The combined frigate force would secure maritime approaches and protect commercial shipping.
Air Operations: Italian F-35As and Greek Rafales would operate from regional bases, providing close air support and reconnaissance. The integration of stealth aircraft from multiple nations would create a formidable air superiority capability while minimising the risk of escalation with neighbouring powers.
Phase II: Humanitarian Bridge (Months 3-12) Peacekeeping
Humanitarian Coordination:
- Establish and secure humanitarian corridors
- Coordinate with international relief organisations
- Provide medical assistance and emergency services
- Facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons
Civil Society Support:
- Protect emerging civil society organisations
- Secure educational and cultural institutions
- Provide technical assistance for basic services
- Support freedom of assembly and expression
Phase III: Institutional Transition (Months 6-24)
Governance Support:
- Provide security for constitutional conventions and elections
- Assist in establishing transitional justice mechanisms
- Support the development of democratic institutions
- Facilitate national reconciliation processes
Economic Reconstruction:
- Secure energy infrastructure and facilitate exports
- Support banking system restoration
- Assist in international economic reintegration
- Provide technical expertise for economic policy development
The Limited Mandate: Bridge, Not Occupation
Principles of Engagement
The coalition would operate under strict principles designed to avoid the mistakes of previous interventions: Temporary Presence: The mission would have a clear timeline tied to specific benchmarks rather than calendar dates, with regular reassessment of the need for continued presence.
Iranian Leadership: Civil society organisations, legitimate political movements, and emerging democratic institutions would lead the transition process, with the coalition providing security , technical support and Peacekeeping Mission rather than governance.
Regional Integration: The coalition would work closely with regional partners, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council states, Turkey, and Iraq, to ensure that Iran’s transition contributes to regional stability rather than creating new tensions.
International Legitimacy: Operations would be conducted under appropriate international mandates, whether through the UN Security Council, NATO Article 5 provisions, or other multilateral frameworks.
Avoiding Historical Pitfalls
Cultural Sensitivity: European partners bring valuable experience in post-conflict societies and would help ensure that operations respect Iranian cultural and religious traditions while supporting democratic values. Economic Focus: Rather than imposing external economic models, the coalition would support Iranian-led economic reconstruction based on the country’s own strengths and preferences.
Regional Stability: The intervention would be designed to strengthen regional stability rather than create new sources of tension or arms races.
Challenges and Risk Mitigation
Operational Challenges
Geographic Constraints: The Persian Gulf’s confined waters present significant tactical challenges, requiring careful coordination to avoid incidents with Iranian naval forces or regional powers. Logistics Complexity: Sustaining a multi-national force over 3,500-4,500 kilometres from European bases requires robust logistics networks and regional base access agreements. Command Integration: Coordinating forces from four different nations with distinct command structures, languages, and operational procedures demands extensive preparation and clear command relationships.
Mitigation Strategies And Framework for Stability
Diplomatic Engagement: Extensive consultations with regional and global powers before and during operations to build support and minimise opposition. Intelligence Coordination: Robust intelligence sharing among coalition partners and with regional allies to anticipate and prevent threats. Civil Society Partnership: Deep engagement with Iranian civil society organisations to ensure that operations support rather than supplant indigenous democratic movements.
The collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran would create both opportunities and dangers for regional and global security. A four-nation coalition comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Greece could provide a stabilisation framework that supports Iranian civil society while managing the risks of nuclear instability and regional conflict.
The Italian and Greek contributions would be significant, bringing modern naval and air capabilities along with valuable European perspectives on post-conflict reconstruction. Italy’s carrier-based aviation and advanced submarine force, combined with Greece’s modernised air force and regional expertise, would complement Anglo-American strategic capabilities while providing crucial legitimacy for the intervention.
Success would depend on several critical factors: maintaining a limited mandate focused on stabilisation rather than occupation, supporting Iranian-led democratic transition processes, securing international legitimacy for operations, and managing regional dynamics to prevent escalation. The coalition would serve as a bridge between the collapse of the current regime and the establishment of a legitimate, democratic Iranian government chosen by the Iranian people themselves.
The current trajectory of events in Iran—marked by persistent domestic unrest, nuclear escalation, and international isolation—suggests that such planning may be more than an academic exercise. Should the regime collapse, the international community must be prepared to support the Iranian people’s democratic aspirations while managing the complex security challenges that would inevitably arise. A carefully structured four-nation coalition could provide the stability and support necessary for Iran to transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance, contributing to regional peace and global security in the process.
The window for such intervention may be narrow, given the nuclear timeline and the regime’s increasing desperation and instability. However, with proper planning, international coordination, and unwavering commitment to supporting Iranian civil society, a stabilization coalition could help ensure that Iran’s eventual transition leads to democracy rather than chaos, regional stability rather than wider conflict, and hope rather than despair for the Iranian people who have suffered so long under authoritarian rule.
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Reference Sources and Documents
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) – Iran Nuclear Reports
- IAEA Board Reports on Iran (2025)
- https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-board-reports
- Contains GOV/2025/25: NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran (May 31, 2025)
- GOV/2025/24: Verification and monitoring report (May 31, 2025)
- IAEA Director General Statement on Iran (June 13, 2025)
- IAEA Director General’s Board Statement (June 16, 2025)
- IAEA UN Security Council Statement
- IAEA Verification and Monitoring Hub
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- UN Peacekeeping Homepage
- https://peacekeeping.un.org/en
- Central resource for peacekeeping operations and policies
- Security Council Peacekeeping Operations
- https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/repertoire/peacekeeping-missions
- Historical precedent: UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) established 1988
- Past UN Peacekeeping Missions
- Current UN Operations Map
Historical Persian Gulf Peacekeeping Precedents
- UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)
- https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/background.html
- Established after 1990 Gulf War
- UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
- https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/uniimogbackgr.html
- 1988-1991 mission following Iran-Iraq War
Regional Security Organizations
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
- GCC Official Website
- https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/Pages/default.aspx
- Founded 1981, six member states
- GCC Regional Security Vision (2024)
- https://gulfif.org/the-gccs-joint-security-vision-reading-between-the-lines/
- First comprehensive security publication
US-GCC Defense Cooperation
- US-GCC Defense Working Groups (Latest)
- https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3784572/joint-statement-us-gulf-cooperation-council-defense-working-groups-on-integrate/
- Integrated Air and Missile Defense & Maritime Security
- US-GCC Maritime Security Cooperation (2022)
- US-GCC Working Groups Update (February 2024)
Academic and Think Tank Analysis
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
- IAEA Iran Report Analysis (May 2025)
- https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-may-2025/
- Independent analysis of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile
- Comprehensive Iran NPT Analysis (May 2025)
International Crisis Group
- Iran-US Trigger List – Strait of Hormuz
- https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-usisrael-trigger-list/flashpoints/strait-hormuz
- Early warning platform for regional flashpoints
Gulf Research Center
- Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf
- https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/76
- Regional perspective on maritime security challenges
News and Current Analysis
Reuters Intelligence
- IAEA Report on Iran Secret Nuclear Activities (May 2025)
- https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iaea-report-says-iran-had-secret-activities-with-undeclared-nuclear-material-2025-05-31/
- Recent confidential findings on undeclared nuclear material
Reference Documents and Treaties
Legal Framework
- UN Charter Chapter VII – Enforcement Actions
- https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7
- Legal basis for international intervention
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
- https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/
- Iran’s legal obligations under international law
Military and Strategic Studies
- Global Security – GCC Analysis
- https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm
- Comprehensive analysis of Gulf Cooperation Council
- Defense Studies – Maritime Security
- https://www.civilsdaily.com/gulf-cooperation-council-gcc/
- Analysis of maritime security threats and Sea Lines of Communication
Additional Research Resources
Historical Context
- List of UN Peacekeeping Missions (Wikipedia)
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_peacekeeping_missions
- Comprehensive database updated May 2025
Media Analysis
- UN Peacekeeping and Gulf War Media Coverage
- https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/11731/12483
- Journal of Conflict Studies analysis
Key Statistics from Sources
- Iran’s Enriched Uranium Stock: 9,247.6 kg as of May 17, 2025 (953.2 kg increase)
- GCC Member States: 6 monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE)
- UN Peacekeeping: Decreased from 16 missions (107,088 peacekeepers) to 11 operations (61,197 peacekeepers) over past decade
- Strait of Hormuz: Transit point for ~20% of world’s traded crude oil
