The longstanding alliance between Cuba and Russia could have experienced a significant resurgence since 2022, marked by increasingly close diplomatic ties and expanding military cooperation. Once again, the small island of Cuba, in the near future, could hold the strategic geopolitical balance in constraining United States aggression in Central and South America and globally. Russia said its businesses would invest more than $1 billion in long-time political ally Cuba by 2030, representing a substantial economic commitment that underscores Moscow’s strategic interest in maintaining and strengthening its Caribbean foothold. The military dimension of this partnership has become particularly pronounced. Russia and Cuba will continue developing their cooperation in the technical military sphere, according to Moscow’s ambassador in Havana, signalling an ongoing commitment to defence collaboration. This cooperation has expanded beyond theoretical agreements to a tangible military presence, as evidenced by multiple Russian naval visits to Cuban waters throughout 2024. Recent parliamentary developments have further solidified these ties. The State Duma, Russia’s lower chamber of legislators, bristled in late March 2025 at the strengthening multifaceted ties with Cuba during the first-class interaction, indicating high-level political support for the bilateral relationship at the legislative level.
Naval Deployments and Military Exercises
The most visible manifestation of renewed Cuba-Russia military cooperation has been the series of Russian naval visits to Cuban ports. In June 2024, three Russian ships and a nuclear-powered submarine arrived in Cuban waters on Wednesday ahead of military exercises in the Caribbean. This deployment included the frigate Admiral Gorshkov and the nuclear-powered submarine Kazan, representing some of Russia’s most advanced naval assets. Cuba’s defence ministry has described the visit as “keeping with the historical friendly ties between Cuba and the Russian Federation”, framing the military cooperation within the context of their longstanding alliance. The exercises were conducted in international waters but demonstrated Russia’s ability to project naval power directly into the Caribbean basin. The pattern of naval visits continued throughout 2024, with three Russian warships arriving in Cuban waters on Saturday, Moscow’s second such maritime voyage in as many months, in a reflection of deepening ties between Russia and Cuba. This regularity suggests an institutionalised approach to military cooperation rather than isolated incidents.
Strategic Motivations and Geopolitical Context
Russia’s renewed focus on Cuba serves multiple strategic objectives within the broader context of great power competition. Moscow’s move is largely calculated to flex naval muscle in the US’s backyard, according to analysts, representing a direct challenge to American regional hegemony in the Caribbean. The timing of these military deployments coincides with escalating tensions over Ukraine, suggesting that Russia views its Cuban partnership as part of a broader strategy to create pressure points for the United States in multiple theatres. This connection includes the possibility of recruiting Cubans by the Russian army and coordination in the fields of intelligence and defence, indicating potential expansion beyond traditional military cooperation. Cuba’s motivations are primarily economic and defensive. Vulnerable, isolated, it is dependent on Russia for steel, oil, wheat, and political backing. The island nation’s ongoing economic crisis, exacerbated by U.S. sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on tourism, has made Russian economic support increasingly critical for the Cuban government’s survival.
Intelligence and Security Cooperation
The military cooperation extends beyond visible naval deployments to intelligence operations. Russian intelligence agencies operate in force in Cuba, as do Chinese spies, according to U.S. officials. This intelligence presence provides Russia with significant capabilities for monitoring U.S. activities in the southeastern United States and the Caribbean region. The intelligence cooperation between Cuba and Russia has historical precedents dating back to the Soviet era, but modern capabilities far exceed those of the Cold War period. Advanced electronic surveillance systems, cyber warfare capabilities, and signals intelligence operations could provide Russia with unprecedented insights into U.S. military and civilian communications. Recent developments suggest this cooperation may be expanding. Russia calls on Cuba and its allies in Latin America for “security consultations”, indicating Moscow’s interest in coordinating security policies across the region and potentially establishing a broader network of intelligence cooperation.
Potential Military Asset Deployments
While the current Russian military presence in Cuba has been limited to naval visits and intelligence operations, the strengthening relationship creates conditions for more substantial military deployments. Several categories of military assets could potentially be stationed in Cuba: Advanced Russian air defence systems, such as S-400 or S-500 missiles, could create significant challenges for U.S. military operations in the Caribbean. These systems would provide Cuba with unprecedented defensive capabilities while potentially creating anti-access zones that complicate American military planning for the region. The deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles would represent the most provocative escalation, directly paralleling the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Modern Russian systems like the Iskander missile family could provide precision strike capabilities against targets throughout the southeastern United States while maintaining plausible deniability about their specific targeting. Russia could deploy sophisticated electronic warfare systems that would enhance its intelligence gathering capabilities while providing options for disrupting U.S. military communications and navigation systems. These systems could operate under the cover of civilian or defensive purposes while providing significant military advantages. The expansion of existing Cuban port facilities to support Russian nuclear submarines would provide Moscow with a permanent naval presence in the Caribbean. Such facilities could support both attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, fundamentally altering the strategic balance in the Western Hemisphere.
Russia’s billion-dollar investment commitment to Cuba provides the economic foundation for expanded military cooperation. However, this investment comes at a time when Russia’s own economy faces significant constraints from international sanctions and military expenditures in Ukraine and other theatres. The economic relationship serves multiple purposes for both countries. For Russia, it provides strategic leverage and economic influence in the Western Hemisphere while creating potential markets for Russian military equipment and technology. For Cuba, Russian investment offers a lifeline for its struggling economy and reduced dependence on traditional partners. However, the sustainability of this economic relationship remains questionable. Russia’s ability to fulfil its investment commitments while managing other economic pressures is uncertain, and Cuba’s capacity to provide meaningful returns on Russian investment is limited by its economic constraints and international isolation.
The operational framework would require compartmentalised knowledge, with only the highest levels of both Russian and Cuban leadership aware of the program’s true nature. Mid-level officials might be told they are supporting defensive air defence systems or civilian space programs, while construction workers and technicians would be led to believe they are building legitimate industrial facilities. The program would likely be structured as a joint venture between Russian military intelligence (GRU), Cuban intelligence services, and carefully selected private contractors with histories of sensitive operations. This structure would provide plausible deniability while maintaining operational security through need-to-know protocols.
Missile Systems and Technical Specifications
The missiles deployed would likely be intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) or medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) rather than intercontinental systems. The Iskander-M system, with its 500-kilometre range, could cover much of Florida and the southeastern United States while maintaining the fiction of being defensive weapons. However, modified versions with extended ranges could potentially reach targets as far as Washington D.C. and major Eastern seaboard cities. More provocative would be the deployment of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, which could be launched from modified aircraft or ground-based systems. These weapons’ speed and manoeuvrability would make them extremely difficult to intercept, fundamentally altering the strategic balance. The missiles could be equipped with conventional warheads initially, with nuclear warheads introduced later under even greater secrecy. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) represent another category of potential deployment. Russian submarines could pre-position missiles in concealed underwater facilities along Cuba’s coast, creating a persistent nuclear threat that would be nearly impossible to detect or neutralise. These systems could remain dormant for extended periods, activated only during periods of heightened tension. The program might also include tactical nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use, such as nuclear artillery shells or short-range missiles. These weapons could be disguised as conventional munitions and stored in what appear to be normal military depots, providing Russia with escalation options below the level of strategic nuclear weapons.
Logistics and Transportation
The logistics of secretly transporting nuclear weapons to Cuba would be extraordinarily complex and risky. The program would likely use a combination of civilian shipping, diplomatic pouches, and specialised military transport to move components and materials. Nuclear warheads might be transported separately from delivery systems, assembled only after arrival in Cuba. Russian cargo ships could carry missile components disguised as civilian machinery or industrial equipment. Diplomatic immunity could protect certain shipments, while others might be concealed within legitimate trade goods. The program would require extensive use of shell companies and false documentation to obscure the true nature of shipments. Air transport would be limited to the most sensitive components, using diplomatic aircraft or specially modified civilian planes. The program might establish a network of intermediate staging points in friendly countries to break up transportation routes and reduce the risk of detection. Once in Cuba, the program would need extensive underground storage facilities to protect nuclear materials from both detection and environmental hazards. These facilities would require sophisticated climate control, security systems, and radiation shielding, all of which would need to be constructed without arousing suspicion.
A secret nuclear missile program would require sophisticated command and control systems that could operate independently of normal military communications networks. The program might establish encrypted communication links between Moscow, Havana, and missile sites using satellite communications, underwater cables, or even quantum encryption technologies. The command structure would likely include multiple levels of authorisation for missile launches, with both Russian and Cuban officials holding keys or codes necessary for activation. This would ensure that neither country could unilaterally launch nuclear weapons without the other’s consent while maintaining the fiction of Cuban sovereignty over the weapons. The program would need to establish clear protocols for different threat levels, from peacetime concealment to wartime readiness.
Intelligence penetration represents perhaps the greatest risk, as discovery by U.S. intelligence agencies could trigger a crisis similar to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis but potentially with even higher stakes. The program would need detailed contingency plans for various discovery scenarios, from gradual intelligence gathering to sudden revelation. Technical failures could also pose significant risks, as nuclear accidents or missile malfunctions could expose the program while creating humanitarian disasters. The program would need extensive safety protocols and emergency response capabilities to manage these risks. Political changes in either Russia or Cuba could fundamentally alter the program’s viability. The program would need to be structured to survive changes in leadership while maintaining operational security across different political configurations.
Chinese Economic and Technological Support
China’s massive investment in Latin America, with trade that grew to a record $518 billion in 2024, provides the economic foundation for expanded cooperation with Cuba. The CCP used a Belt and Road Initiative power play and extended a credit line of $9.2 billion to the Latin American countries in attendance, with a very important caveat: The currency used in the line of credit would be the Chinese yuan, demonstrating Beijing’s willingness to provide substantial financial support to regional allies. For Cuba specifically, Chinese support could include advanced construction equipment, electronic warfare systems, and sophisticated camouflage technologies that would be essential for concealing nuclear installations. China’s experience in constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea demonstrates capabilities that could be adapted for creating concealed missile facilities in Cuba. Chinese cyber warfare and signals intelligence capabilities could provide crucial support for defeating U.S. surveillance systems. The integration of Chinese electronic warfare systems with Russian missile deployments could create synergistic effects that would be more difficult to detect and counter than either nation’s capabilities alone.
Dual-Use Technology and Infrastructure
China is making heavy investments in airports, seaports, and other critical infrastructure in Latin America, especially Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, and Brazil. This infrastructure development provides perfect cover for military applications. Chinese-built ports could accommodate Russian naval vessels, while Chinese-constructed airports could support military transport aircraft carrying sensitive materials. The Belt and Road Initiative provides an ideal framework for dual-use infrastructure development. On December 25, 2021, Cuba and China signed a “cooperation plan” for the joint promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, creating formal mechanisms for Chinese infrastructure investment that could conceal military applications. Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, including 5G networks and satellite communications systems, could provide secure command and control capabilities for nuclear weapons systems. The integration of Chinese and Russian communications technologies could create redundant, secure networks that would be extremely difficult for U.S. intelligence to penetrate.
Panama Canal Strategic Control
The Panama Canal represents perhaps the most significant strategic prize in any Chinese-Russian cooperation scenario. While Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino stated that there was no Chinese control or participation in managing the canal, the reality is more complex. Even though China does not directly control the Panama Canal, it still holds significant sway at both its Pacific and Atlantic entrances. Coupled with a major uptick in Chinese investment in Panama, underscored by Panama’s decision to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has positioned itself to exert substantial influence over canal operations. Chinese control over the Panama Canal could be achieved through a combination of economic pressure, infrastructure investment, and political influence rather than direct military seizure. The process might unfold over several stages:
Economic Integration: China could increase its investment in Panamanian infrastructure, becoming indispensable to the country’s economic development. In 2024, the Canal Authority made nearly $5 billion and gave half of it to the Panamanian treasury, which was about 4% of Panama’s GDP. Chinese investment could gradually increase this dependence.
Operational Influence Through joint ventures and technical cooperation agreements, Chinese companies could gain operational roles in canal management, maintenance, and expansion projects. This would provide intimate knowledge of canal operations and potential leverage over decision-making processes.
Strategic Pressure During a crisis, China could use its economic leverage to influence canal operations, potentially restricting access for U.S. military vessels or prioritising Chinese and Russian shipping. Other major users of the waterway include Chile, China, Japan, and South Korea, giving China significant influence through its shipping volume.
De Facto Control Through a combination of economic dependence, operational involvement, and political influence, China could achieve de facto control over canal operations without formal ownership. This would allow Beijing to regulate maritime traffic in a way that supports broader strategic objectives.
Coordinated Strategic Framework
The integration of Chinese economic power, Russian military capabilities, and Cuban geographic position could create a formidable strategic triangle. This coordination might involve: Intelligence Sharing: Chinese surveillance capabilities in the region could provide early warning of U.S. military movements, while Russian intelligence assets could monitor U.S. communications and decision-making processes. Economic Warfare: China’s economic leverage throughout Latin America could be used to pressure countries to remain neutral or supportive during any crisis involving nuclear weapons in Cuba. Technological Integration: Chinese and Russian military technologies could be integrated to create weapons systems and defensive capabilities that exceed what either nation could deploy independently. Strategic Coordination: The timing of various actions—from Chinese economic pressure to Russian military deployments—could be coordinated to maximise strategic impact while minimising opportunities for effective U.S. responses.
Strategic Implications and Outcomes
The successful deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba would fundamentally alter the global strategic balance. The proximity of nuclear weapons to major U.S. population centres would create new dynamics of deterrence and potentially force changes in U.S. foreign policy and military doctrine. The program could provide Russia with significant leverage in negotiations over other issues, from Ukraine to arms control agreements. The mere existence of nuclear weapons in Cuba could force the United States to make concessions on issues seemingly unrelated to Caribbean security. However, the program would also create new vulnerabilities for both Russia and Cuba. The concentration of valuable military assets in a small, isolated island would create tempting targets for U.S. military action while potentially triggering an arms race throughout the Western Hemisphere. The long-term sustainability of such a program would depend on numerous factors, including the stability of the Russia-Cuba relationship, the evolution of U.S.-Russia relations, and changes in military technology that might affect the weapons’ effectiveness or detectability.
Future Trajectory and Strategic Implications
The trajectory of Cuba-Russia military cooperation will likely depend on several factors: the evolution of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s economic capacity to sustain foreign military deployments, Cuba’s domestic political stability, and the intensity of U.S. responses to Russian activities. The historical parallel to the Cuban Missile Crisis provides both opportunities and constraints for Russian strategic planning. While the 1962 crisis demonstrated the potential for nuclear confrontation over Cuba, it also established precedents for the negotiated resolution of superpower tensions in the Caribbean. Modern technological capabilities create new opportunities for military cooperation that did not exist during the Cold War. Advanced surveillance systems, cyber warfare capabilities, and precision-guided weapons provide options for military pressure that could be more subtle but equally effective than the nuclear weapons that dominated Cold War calculations. The economic dimensions of the relationship also create new dynamics. Unlike the Soviet Union’s ideological commitment to supporting Cuba regardless of economic costs, modern Russia’s relationship with Cuba is more transactional and subject to economic constraints. This creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities for the partnership. The strengthening military cooperation between Cuba and Russia represents a significant development in Caribbean security dynamics and great power competition. While current cooperation has been limited to naval visits, intelligence operations, and economic agreements, the trajectory suggests potential for more substantial military deployments that could fundamentally alter regional security calculations. The success of expanded Russian military presence in Cuba will depend on Moscow’s ability to provide sustained economic support to Cuba while managing the costs and risks of military deployment thousands of miles from Russian territory. For Cuba, the relationship offers economic benefits and security guarantees but also risks further isolation from Western economies and potential military confrontation. The United States faces the challenge of responding to Russian activities in Cuba without escalating tensions to crisis levels while maintaining deterrence against more provocative Russian deployments. The regional implications of this developing partnership will likely influence security policies throughout the Caribbean and Latin America for years to come. The historical precedent of the Cuban Missile Crisis provides both warnings and guidance for managing contemporary tensions, but the different technological, economic, and geopolitical context of the 2020s creates new challenges and opportunities that will require careful navigation by all parties involved.
Recent Military Activities:
- Three Russian ships and a nuclear-powered submarine arrived in Cuban waters Wednesday ahead of military exercises in the Caribbean Russian military exercises in the Caribbean: Here’s what to expect – CBS News in June 2024
- Three Russian warships arrived in Cuban waters on Saturday, Moscow’s second such maritime voyage in as many months in a reflection of deepening ties between Russia and Cuba Russian warships make another visit to Cuban waters in show of growing ties | PBS News in July 2024
Economic Commitments:
- Russia said its businesses would invest more than $1 billion in long-time political ally Cuba by 2030 Russia promises to invest $1 billion in ally Cuba by 2030 | Reuters, representing a major economic lifeline for Cuba’s struggling economy
Diplomatic Developments:
- Russia and Cuba will continue developing their cooperation in the technical military sphere Russia and Cuba will keep developing technical military cooperation -RIA | Reuters, according to Moscow’s ambassador
- The State Duma, Russia’s lower chamber of legislators, bristled in late March 2025 at the strengthening multifaceted ties with Cuba Russia and Cuba Bristling at Growing Bilateral Ties – Modern Diplomacy
Strategic Implications:
- Moscow’s move is largely calculated to flex naval muscle in the US’s back yard Why are Russian warships in Cuba? | Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera
- This connection includes the possibility of recruiting Cubans by the Russian army and coordination in the fields of intelligence and defense Russia calls on Cuba and its allies in Latin America for “security consultations.”
