Republic of Italy Decades of Human Rights Violations

Italy’s legal framework for migration has been repeatedly condemned by domestic courts, international bodies, and UN experts as unconstitutional or incompatible with human rights law. The trajectory spans successive governments across the political spectrum.

1998: Turco-Napolitano Law (L. 40/1998)Established the first administrative detention centres (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea, CPT), introducing de facto indefinite administrative detention of migrants without individual judicial scrutiny — a model widely criticised as incompatible with Art. 13 of the Italian Constitution (personal liberty) and Art. 5 ECHR.

2002: Bossi-Fini Law (L. 189/2002)Introduced criminal sanctions for illegal entry; extended detention from 30 to 60 days; fingerprinted all foreign nationals applying for residency; placed asylum seekers in detention during review, in direct contravention of Art. 5 ECHR. Proposed by Gianfranco Fini (neo-fascist National Alliance) and Umberto Bossi (Lega Nord). Condemned by the UNHCR, trade unions, and immigrant associations. The law linked residency permits strictly to employment contracts, creating structural precarity.

2008: Berlusconi “Security Package” (L. 125/2008)Amended the penal code to introduce irregular immigration status as an aggravating circumstance in criminal proceedings — effectively criminalising migrants as a category and violating the principle of equality before the law (Art. 3 of the Italian Constitution).

2017: Minniti-Orlando Decree (L. 46/2017)Eliminated the right to appeal first-instance rejection of asylum applications (reducing it to Supreme Court only), removed courts’ obligation to hear asylum seekers, and broadened criteria for assessing absconding risk. Legal scholars argued these provisions violated the constitutional right to a fair hearing (Art. 24) and the principle of effective judicial remedy.

2018: Salvini Decree I — Decreto Sicurezza (D.L. 113/2018, L. 132/2018)Doubled maximum CPR detention from 90 to 180 days. Abolished humanitarian protection status, removing protection from tens of thousands of migrants. Created new grounds for asylum seeker detention for identification. Several Italian mayors (including Palermo’s Leoluca Orlando) refused to implement the law, calling it unconstitutional. The OHCHR stated it would “certainly lead to violations of international human rights law.”

2019: Salvini Decree II — Decreto Sicurezza Bis (D.L. 53/2019)Granted the Interior Minister power to prohibit entry, transit or stay of ships in Italian territorial waters. Imposed fines of up to €5,500 per rescued person on NGO vessels. Prosecutors in Sicily later brought criminal charges against Salvini for effectively kidnapping migrants aboard the Open Arms vessel; he was acquitted in December 2024. UN human rights experts condemned the decree as incompatible with international maritime law and human rights obligations.

2023: Piantedosi Decree / Anti-Rescue Law (D.L. 1/2023, L. 15/2023)Signed by President Meloni on January 2, 2023. Prohibited NGO rescue ships from conducting multiple rescues per mission; forced vessels to head to distant northern ports after each rescue; imposed fines of up to €10,000 and 20-day ship detention for non-compliance. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders called it “a darkening stain on Italy’s commitment to human rights.” Nine NGO vessels were detained in the first year alone.

2023:Cutro Decree (converted May 2023)Named after the deadly February 2023 shipwreck. Restricted access to “special protection” (protezione speciale); prevented conversion of special protection to work permits, likely increasing undocumented workers; extended detention periods; limited right of appeal (flagged as potentially unconstitutional by the parliament’s own legislative committee). Human Rights Watch called it “a new low” in Italy’s deterrence-focused strategy.

2024: Rome Court of Appeal — Pushback ruling (January 2022)A Rome court ruled that pushbacks to Slovenia under a decades-old readmission agreement violated the Italian Constitution, the ECHR, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, due to the risk of chain refoulement and inhuman treatment along the Balkan route. The ruling confirmed systematic violations Italy had conducted for years.

Systemic pattern: The Italian Constitutional Court and the ECHR have repeatedly found that Italy’s administrative detention of migrants lacks the legal basis required by Art. 13 of the Constitution and Art. 5 ECHR. Despite successive condemnations, Italy has not introduced a valid statutory framework governing hotspot detention — a gap that has persisted from 2016 to at least 2025.

CPR detention centres: violence, abuse, and systemic violations

Italy’s pre-removal detention centres — originally called Centri di Permanenza Temporanea (1998), later renamed CIEs (Centri di Identificazione ed Espulsione), and now CPRs (Centri di Permanenza per il Rimpatrio) — have been a site of documented and recurring human rights violations spanning the entire period since 2000. Over twenty years after their initial opening, more than thirty people have died inside Italian CPR facilities. The conditions have been described by the Council of Europe’s Anti-Torture Committee as resembling those used for prisoners under special high-security regime.

The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) conducted an ad hoc visit in April 2024 to CPRs in Milan, Gradisca, Potenza, and Rome. Its December 2024 report found several cases of physical ill-treatment and excessive use of force by police officers, typically following disturbances or acts of vandalism. The CPT reported a complete absence of rigorous independent monitoring of such police interventions and no accurate recording of injuries sustained by detained persons. The CPT specifically documented the widespread and systematic administration of unprescribed psychotropic drugs diluted in water to detainees at the Potenza CPR — a practice constituting a form of chemical restraint amounting to ill-treatment under Art. 3 ECHR.

The CPT found that detainees were “effectively warehoused” with minimal purposeful activities. Tender specifications for CPR management had not been respected by private contractors. Conditions documented include: poor and inedible food, lack of medical care, fears of scabies outbreaks, cage-like outdoor facilities, triple metal mesh screens on windows, and shortage of toiletries. The physical layout was assessed as comparable to high-security prison units — an environment the CPT stated was wholly disproportionate to the administrative (not criminal) nature of the detention. Detainees were transported to CPRs handcuffed in police vehicles without being offered food or water during journeys, in violation of basic standards for the treatment of persons deprived of liberty.

Criminal investigations into contractors The CPT noted that several criminal investigations had been opened against the private management companies of various CPRs, reflecting systemic governance failures and lack of transparency. Milan CPR (February 2024) A detainee protest against “undignified sanitary conditions,” inedible food, and lack of medical care was met with violent repression. Armed police entered the facility upon staff request and confrontations ensued — a pattern repeated across multiple facilities.

Lampedusa hotspot violations: The ECtHR ruled in 2016 (Khlaifia v. Italy) and again in 2023 (J.A. and Others v. Italy) that Italy had violated Arts. 3 and 5 ECHR for detaining migrants in the Lampedusa hotspot in inhumane conditions without judicial oversight. The facility — designed for 850 persons — was documented housing up to 2,000. Italy failed to implement the 2016 ruling, continuing the same practices for at least five years.

CPT conclusion (Dec 2024): “In light of the findings on the highly deficient management of the four CPRs visited and the lack of transparency in their running by private companies, the CPT considers that there are serious doubts regarding the application of such a model by Italy in an extraterritorial context, such as Albania.”

Italy–Albania deal — illegal third-country processing hub

In 2023, Prime Minister Meloni signed a bilateral protocol with Albania to establish two offshore migrant processing centres on Albanian territory — Shengjin (reception) and Gjader (detention). Under the deal, migrants rescued in international waters by Italian authorities would be transferred to Albania for asylum processing under Italian law. Italy earmarked €650 million over five years and heralded the arrangement as a European model. Multiple courts have ruled against it.

First transfer — immediately blocked by Rome courtsThe first group of migrants was transferred to Albania in October 2024. Italian judges refused to validate their detention, ruling that their countries of origin (Bangladesh and Egypt) did not qualify as “safe” under EU law. The cases were referred to the European Court of Justice. Second transfer blocked — third attempt fails (Jan 2025)A second small group was similarly returned. A third attempt in January 2025 saw 49 migrants transferred; an Italian appeals court again refused to approve their expulsion and referred the case to the ECJ. 43 were returned to Italy by naval vessel.

ECJ rules against Italy’s “safe country of origin” designations: The Court of Justice of the EU ruled that Italy’s rules on designating certain countries as “safe” were incompatible with EU asylum law. The Court found that designations must allow for effective and transparent judicial review based on publicly accessible evidence — standards Italy did not meet. Amnesty International described it as “a heavy blow to the harmful Italy-Albania migration deal.” Court of Cassation legal analysis — constitutional violationsItaly’s Court of Cassation concluded that the Italy-Albania agreement may violate the Italian Constitution, EU law, and multiple human rights treaties. The analysis identified structural incompatibilities with the right to asylum and principles of non-refoulement.

CPT cautions that Albania model is built on a broken domestic systemThe Council of Europe’s Anti-Torture Committee explicitly warned that the deficiencies found in Italian CPRs “call into question the application of such a model… in Albania” — meaning Italy was attempting to export a detention system that was itself already in violation of human rights standards. Despite repeated court defeats, Italy continues attempting transfers to Albania, having redefined the centres’ role to process migrants whose asylum claims have already been rejected. The underlying legal framework remains contested before the ECJ and Italian courts. Civil society organisations and the opposition have called the entire arrangement illegal under EU and international law.

The European Commission cited Italy’s Albania deal as a model from which “lessons could be drawn,” despite its illegality findings. In March 2025, the Commission proposed changes to the Return Directive that could institutionalise “return hubs” — a policy directly comparable to the Italy-Albania arrangement. Critics warned this would normalise offshore processing at EU level.

Italy–Libya MoU, proxy pushbacks & complicity in abuse

Italy’s cooperation with Libya on migration control — formalised through a 2017 Memorandum of Understanding — represents one of the most serious ongoing cases of a European state funding, training, and enabling a third country to intercept migrants and return them to a system of documented torture, rape, slavery, and arbitrary detention. The 2012 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy ECtHR Grand Chamber judgment had already definitively established that direct Italian pushbacks to Libya violated Art. 3 (prohibition of torture), Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion), and Art. 13 (right to an effective remedy). Rather than comply with this ruling, Italy restructured the policy: instead of conducting pushbacks directly, it financed and equipped the Libyan Coast Guard to conduct what critics called “pullbacks” — achieving indirectly what it had been forbidden from doing directly. Between the MoU’s formalisation in 2017 and 2024, Italy’s Interior Ministry committed €59 million to support Libya’s Integrated Border and Migration Management — without human rights conditionality. ActionAid documented that “Italy did not condition the funds to Libya in accordance with human rights, and they have done nothing to ensure compliance.” By late October 2021, Libyan forces receiving Italian and EU support had intercepted at sea and returned to Libya more than 27,500 people — exposing them to documented conditions including beatings, rape, starvation, and arbitrary imprisonment. The UNHCR has repeatedly stated: “Libya cannot be considered a safe place for the return of migrants intercepted or rescued at sea.”

In 2025, the ECHR delivered its first judgment on Italy’s “pullback” policy (S.S. and Others v. Italy), concerning a November 2017 event in which the Libyan Coast Guard — acting as a proxy of Italian authorities — violently intercepted approximately 130 migrants from a sinking dinghy, with at least 20 people killed. The Court found Italy’s jurisdictional responsibility raised serious questions, though it did not find a full violation — a ruling criticised by legal scholars as enabling continued proxy violations. Despite all of this, Italy allowed the Libya MoU to automatically renew in November 2024 for another three years. Italy’s parliament renewed Libya cooperation funding in July 2021 despite, as HRW noted, “overwhelming evidence of brutality against migrants, the systematic use of arbitrary detention, and the complete absence of an asylum system in Libya.”

Ongoing complicity: Amnesty International has said Italy is “complicit in abuse” in Libya. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has called for Italy to scrap or fundamentally revise the MoU. Italy has done neither, and the 2024 renewal came with no human rights conditions attached.

Maritime deaths & failure to rescue

Italy’s central position in the Mediterranean and its obligations under international maritime law (SOLAS, SAR Convention) place it at the epicentre of Europe’s deadliest migration corridor. Yet Italy has systematically restricted, criminalised, and obstructed the very rescue capacities needed to prevent mass deaths at sea. The Cutro shipwreck of February 26, 2023 — in which at least 94 people, including 34 children, drowned metres from the Italian shore — became a defining symbol of institutional failure. The vessel “Summer Love” had been spotted and monitored for hours. Italian authorities knew the boat was in danger in rough seas and did not dispatch coastguard vessels in time to rescue those aboard. On January 30, 2026, six coastguard and customs officials were ordered to stand trial for multiple manslaughter related to negligence — a rare but significant accountability moment.

More broadly, according to the UN, at least 34,129 people have died or gone missing in the Mediterranean Sea since 2014. In 2023 alone — the deadliest year since 2017 — more than 2,500 people died on the central Mediterranean route. In January 2025, at least 454 people died or went missing in a single month. Italy’s civil aviation authority ENAC issued orders in May 2024 banning civilian NGO aircraft from monitoring events in the central Mediterranean from five Sicilian airports, further narrowing the already-depleted rescue capacity. These orders bore the title “Irregular migratory phenomenon by sea” — framing humanitarian search and rescue as a security, not a life-saving, activity.

Criminalisation of NGO sea rescue

Italy has pursued a sustained, multi-year campaign to criminalise humanitarian sea rescue organisations, prosecute their crew members, and obstruct their operations through legislative and administrative means. This strategy predates but has accelerated sharply under the Meloni government. In May 2022, criminal proceedings were opened against 21 people at the Court of Trapani, including four Iuventa crew members, for alleged collaboration with people smugglers — arising from rescue missions conducted in 2016 and 2017. All charges were eventually dropped. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor, condemned the proceedings in February 2023 as “a darkening stain on Italy and the EU’s commitment to human rights.”

The Piantedosi Decree (Law 15/2023) operationalised the obstruction: by requiring ships to sail immediately to distant ports — sometimes days of sailing from rescue sites — after each rescue, the law effectively prohibited multiple consecutive rescues. NGOs described having to choose between complying with Italian law and fulfilling their legal duty under international maritime law to rescue people in distress. Since February 2023, nine NGO rescue ships were detained by Italian authorities. Fines of up to €10,000 per infraction were imposed, with the added threat of permanent vessel confiscation. Sea-Watch described the law as “aimed at criminalising solidarity.” The UN Special Rapporteur agreed that the legislation violated international maritime law. The combined effect of these policies — reduced NGO presence, distant ports, monitoring bans — contributed directly to the record death tolls of 2023 and 2024, according to the signatory organisations of a February 2024 joint NGO statement.

ECHR & international court rulings finding the Republic of Italy liable of gross and repeated human rights violations

Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy — ECHR Grand Chamber.Landmark ruling finding Italy violated Arts. 3, 4 (Prot. 4), and 13 ECHR for pushback operations to Libya in 2009. All 17 Grand Chamber judges unanimously condemned Italy. Each applicant awarded €15,000 in compensation. Italy’s response was to redesign — not end — the pushback policy.

Khlaifia and Others v. Italy — ECHR Grand Chamber.Found Italy violated Art. 5 ECHR (right to liberty) and Art. 4 Protocol 4 (collective expulsion) for arbitrary detention and mass deportation from Lampedusa. Italy did not reform the hotspot system in response.

J.A. and Others v. Italy — ECHR Chamber.Found Italy violated Arts. 3, 4, and 5 ECHR for the conditions of detention at Lampedusa hotspot and collective expulsion of four Tunisian nationals in 2017. Italy was again found to have detained people without legal basis or judicial oversight.

ECJ — Bangladesh/Egypt Italy-Albania case. The ECJ ruled that Italy had not met EU asylum law standards in the case of two Bangladeshi nationals disembarked in Albania. Found Italy improperly applied the accelerated border procedure based on a flawed “safe country of origin” designation.

S.S. and Others v. Italy — ECHR (pullback policy).First ECtHR judgment on Italy’s proxy pullback policy via the Libya Coast Guard. The Court addressed but limited Italy’s jurisdictional responsibility in the November 2017 incident. Critics noted the ruling allows continuation of pullback practices, creating a “discrepancy” between ICCPR and ECHR regimes.

ECJ — Italy’s “safe country of origin” system incompatible with EU law. Struck down Italy’s method of designating safe countries of origin as incompatible with the EU Asylum Procedures Directive; the ruling delivered a “heavy blow” to the Albania deal and required Italy to ensure judicial review and accessible evidentiary standards.

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I — Italy found non-compliant (Almasri case). Italy formally found to have violated Art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute by releasing and repatriating Osama Elmasry Njeem without ICC consultation. Italy’s domestic law arguments explicitly rejected.

To sum up, The Republic of Italy has accumulated one of the most extensively documented records of migration-related human rights violations of any EU member state since 2000 — across successive governments of both left and right. The violations are not isolated incidents but reflect a systemic pattern across four interconnected domains: Unconstitutional laws — from the 2002 Bossi-Fini law (which placed asylum seekers in detention in violation of Art. 5 ECHR) through the 2018–2019 Salvini Decrees, to the 2023 Piantedosi and Cutro decrees, Italy has enacted legislation that its own courts, the ECtHR, and UN bodies have found to violate constitutional guarantees, non-refoulement obligations, and international human rights norms — often without corrective legislative reform afterward. ICC violation — the January 2025 Almasri case stands as a landmark breach of international criminal cooperation. Italy arrested a Libyan officer accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes, then released him without ICC consultation and flew him home on a government military aircraft. The ICC formally found Italy non-compliant in October 2025, explicitly rejecting Italy’s domestic-law defences. CPR detention abuses — the Council of Europe’s Anti-Torture Committee documented physical ill-treatment by police, administration of unprescribed psychotropic drugs, cage-like facilities, and total absence of independent monitoring in four CPRs visited in April 2024. Over thirty people have died in these facilities since their creation. Third-country processing and Libya — the Albania deal has been rejected by Italian courts and the ECJ on multiple occasions, while the 2017 Libya MoU (repeatedly renewed, most recently in November 2024) has made Italy complicit in documented torture, rape, and arbitrary detention in Libyan facilities, according to Amnesty International, HRW, UNHCR, and the Council of Europe.